Wednesday, December 26, 2007
Intuition Check
Hope everyone had a good Christmas. I'm just hoping to get some intuitive calls on the following two cases. Any feedback would be really useful and really appreciated. (Well, not any feedback. But any germane feedback).
Suppose we're Russellian's about propositions - so Clark Kent can fly is the very same proposition as Superman can fly - but that in order to solve various puzzles about intensional contexts, we hold that we can entertain one and the same proposition under different modes of presentation. Now what do people think of the following?
Scenario 1: Suppose that Jake doesn't realize that Hesperus is Phosphorus. He believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening on the basis of really good evidence. However, he has very good but misleading evidence which suggests that it's not true that Phosphorus is visible in the evening. Does this latter evidence prevent him from knowing that Hesperus is visible in the evening when entertained under a Hesperus mode of presentation (on the assumption that he's otherwise epistemically well-placed enough to count as knowing)?
Scenario 2: Suppose that Jake knows full well that Hesperus is Phosphorus. He believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening on the basis of really good evidence. However, he has very good but misleading evidence which suggests that it's not true that Phosphorus is visible in the evening. Does this latter evidence prevent him from knowing that Hesperus is visible in the evening when entertained under a Hesperus mode of presentation (on the assumption that he's otherwise epistemically well-placed enough to count as knowing)?
Suppose we're Russellian's about propositions - so Clark Kent can fly is the very same proposition as Superman can fly - but that in order to solve various puzzles about intensional contexts, we hold that we can entertain one and the same proposition under different modes of presentation. Now what do people think of the following?
Scenario 1: Suppose that Jake doesn't realize that Hesperus is Phosphorus. He believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening on the basis of really good evidence. However, he has very good but misleading evidence which suggests that it's not true that Phosphorus is visible in the evening. Does this latter evidence prevent him from knowing that Hesperus is visible in the evening when entertained under a Hesperus mode of presentation (on the assumption that he's otherwise epistemically well-placed enough to count as knowing)?
Scenario 2: Suppose that Jake knows full well that Hesperus is Phosphorus. He believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening on the basis of really good evidence. However, he has very good but misleading evidence which suggests that it's not true that Phosphorus is visible in the evening. Does this latter evidence prevent him from knowing that Hesperus is visible in the evening when entertained under a Hesperus mode of presentation (on the assumption that he's otherwise epistemically well-placed enough to count as knowing)?
Labels: Epistemology, Knowability, Philosophy of Language
# posted by Aidan @ 10:39 AM 
Comments:
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Has this type of question never been raised by Russellians about propositions? I find it odd if it hasn't.
Caveat: I think that my intuitions are defective because I think a Russellian view about propositions is false. But I'll try to play along.
I have the intuition that Jake does know in scenario 1 and I think that the case is underdescribed in scenario 2. He knows that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and he believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening. Can't we run a single-premise closure argument to show that he is in a position to know that Phosphorus is visible in the evening? Isn't he being irrational for believing it's not? What kind of evidence is telling him that Phosphorus isn't visible in the evening? I have a hard time imagining good evidence if he knows that they are the same star. More information is needed w/r/t scenario 2. But assuming you can give a good story about good evidence to think that Phosphorus isn't visible in the evening, I think that he doesn't know in scenario 2.
Caveat: I think that my intuitions are defective because I think a Russellian view about propositions is false. But I'll try to play along.
I have the intuition that Jake does know in scenario 1 and I think that the case is underdescribed in scenario 2. He knows that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and he believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening. Can't we run a single-premise closure argument to show that he is in a position to know that Phosphorus is visible in the evening? Isn't he being irrational for believing it's not? What kind of evidence is telling him that Phosphorus isn't visible in the evening? I have a hard time imagining good evidence if he knows that they are the same star. More information is needed w/r/t scenario 2. But assuming you can give a good story about good evidence to think that Phosphorus isn't visible in the evening, I think that he doesn't know in scenario 2.
Ah, I misspoke in my first comment. I said that we can give a one-premise closure argument to show he is in a position to know that Phosphorus is visible in the evening. Of course, that begs the question, for we are trying to determine whether he knows the antecedent! I should of said this: If he knows that Hesperus is Phosphorus and he believes that Hesperus is visible in the night sky, then he is committed to believing that Phosphorus is visible in the night sky. Sorry.
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