Sunday, December 30, 2007
The Reset Paradox
Wednesday, December 26, 2007
Intuition Check
Hope everyone had a good Christmas. I'm just hoping to get some intuitive calls on the following two cases. Any feedback would be really useful and really appreciated. (Well, not any feedback. But any germane feedback).
Suppose we're Russellian's about propositions - so Clark Kent can fly is the very same proposition as Superman can fly - but that in order to solve various puzzles about intensional contexts, we hold that we can entertain one and the same proposition under different modes of presentation. Now what do people think of the following?
Scenario 1: Suppose that Jake doesn't realize that Hesperus is Phosphorus. He believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening on the basis of really good evidence. However, he has very good but misleading evidence which suggests that it's not true that Phosphorus is visible in the evening. Does this latter evidence prevent him from knowing that Hesperus is visible in the evening when entertained under a Hesperus mode of presentation (on the assumption that he's otherwise epistemically well-placed enough to count as knowing)?
Scenario 2: Suppose that Jake knows full well that Hesperus is Phosphorus. He believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening on the basis of really good evidence. However, he has very good but misleading evidence which suggests that it's not true that Phosphorus is visible in the evening. Does this latter evidence prevent him from knowing that Hesperus is visible in the evening when entertained under a Hesperus mode of presentation (on the assumption that he's otherwise epistemically well-placed enough to count as knowing)?
Suppose we're Russellian's about propositions - so Clark Kent can fly is the very same proposition as Superman can fly - but that in order to solve various puzzles about intensional contexts, we hold that we can entertain one and the same proposition under different modes of presentation. Now what do people think of the following?
Scenario 1: Suppose that Jake doesn't realize that Hesperus is Phosphorus. He believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening on the basis of really good evidence. However, he has very good but misleading evidence which suggests that it's not true that Phosphorus is visible in the evening. Does this latter evidence prevent him from knowing that Hesperus is visible in the evening when entertained under a Hesperus mode of presentation (on the assumption that he's otherwise epistemically well-placed enough to count as knowing)?
Scenario 2: Suppose that Jake knows full well that Hesperus is Phosphorus. He believes that Hesperus is visible in the evening on the basis of really good evidence. However, he has very good but misleading evidence which suggests that it's not true that Phosphorus is visible in the evening. Does this latter evidence prevent him from knowing that Hesperus is visible in the evening when entertained under a Hesperus mode of presentation (on the assumption that he's otherwise epistemically well-placed enough to count as knowing)?
Labels: Epistemology, Knowability, Philosophy of Language
Monday, December 24, 2007
CFP: Powers, Dispositions, and Singular Causation
For the metaphysicians amongst you, Adam Taylor at Buffalo University is organizing a conference in metaphysics happening on April 5th 2008. If you're interested, the deadline for submissions is soon: January 10th to be precise.
The keynote address will be by Stephen Mumford of the University of Nottingham. Be sure to check out Adam's lovely website for the conference, which includes the full call for papers.
The keynote address will be by Stephen Mumford of the University of Nottingham. Be sure to check out Adam's lovely website for the conference, which includes the full call for papers.
Labels: Conferences
Saturday, December 22, 2007
Quotation and Disquotation
In Language Turned on Itself, Cappelen and Lepore argue that any viable theory of quotation must preserve the following disquotational schema and strong disquotational schema:
QS: ' 'e' ' quotes 'e',
SDS: Only ' 'e' ' quotes 'e',
where both occurances of 'e' are replaced by any quotable item (25-6).
Now, Cappelen and Lepore's own minimalist theory simply takes QS as 'the fundamental axiom governing the semantics of quotation expressions' (124). So it's in the bag. Cappelen and Lepore go on to argue that QS entails SDS, so long as quotation expressions are unambiguous. Here's their argument from p128:
"- From QS it follows that for any quotable item e, ' 'e' ' quotes 'e'. If ' 'e' ' quotes some quotable other than 'e', say 'a', then it follows that the quotation expression ' 'e' ' is ambiguous (because it quotes both 'e' and 'a').
- But, as we argued in Ch. 7, quotation expressions are unambiguous (and context-insensitive and not semantically indeterminate).
- So the quotation expression ' 'e' ' can only quote 'e'.
- So SDS follows."
But notice the conclusion reached isn't SDS at all; we wanted to reach the claim that only ' 'e' ' quotes 'e', not that
' 'e' ' only quotes 'e'. And these simply aren't the same claim (even if they turn out to be equivalent).
Fortunately I think there's a quick fix to their argument so that they clearly get the result they want. For suppose that something other than ' 'e' ', let's say ' 'a' ', quotes 'e'. From QS it follows that ' 'a' ' also quotes 'a'. But then ' 'a' ' quotes both 'a' and 'e', and hence would be ambiguous. So, if quotation expressions are unambiguous, only ' 'e' ' quotes 'e', as required.
This is, I submit, how Cappelen and Lepore should have run their argument. QS is exploited to show that if something other than ' 'e' ' quotes 'e', that quotation expression would have to quote something else also, and hence would be ambiguous.
QS: ' 'e' ' quotes 'e',
SDS: Only ' 'e' ' quotes 'e',
where both occurances of 'e' are replaced by any quotable item (25-6).
Now, Cappelen and Lepore's own minimalist theory simply takes QS as 'the fundamental axiom governing the semantics of quotation expressions' (124). So it's in the bag. Cappelen and Lepore go on to argue that QS entails SDS, so long as quotation expressions are unambiguous. Here's their argument from p128:
"- From QS it follows that for any quotable item e, ' 'e' ' quotes 'e'. If ' 'e' ' quotes some quotable other than 'e', say 'a', then it follows that the quotation expression ' 'e' ' is ambiguous (because it quotes both 'e' and 'a').
- But, as we argued in Ch. 7, quotation expressions are unambiguous (and context-insensitive and not semantically indeterminate).
- So the quotation expression ' 'e' ' can only quote 'e'.
- So SDS follows."
But notice the conclusion reached isn't SDS at all; we wanted to reach the claim that only ' 'e' ' quotes 'e', not that
' 'e' ' only quotes 'e'. And these simply aren't the same claim (even if they turn out to be equivalent).
Fortunately I think there's a quick fix to their argument so that they clearly get the result they want. For suppose that something other than ' 'e' ', let's say ' 'a' ', quotes 'e'. From QS it follows that ' 'a' ' also quotes 'a'. But then ' 'a' ' quotes both 'a' and 'e', and hence would be ambiguous. So, if quotation expressions are unambiguous, only ' 'e' ' quotes 'e', as required.
This is, I submit, how Cappelen and Lepore should have run their argument. QS is exploited to show that if something other than ' 'e' ' quotes 'e', that quotation expression would have to quote something else also, and hence would be ambiguous.
Labels: Cappelen and Lepore, Context Dependence, Philosophy of Language
Tuesday, December 18, 2007
Raining in Baltimore
I finally got clear of work from the semester this afternoon. It's been a long four months. In any case, the lack of posting will probably continue as Lauren and I spend some time in North Carolina, and I try to make some serious progress formulating my dissertation project. I'm still confident things will pick up here come the New Year.
Let me just wish everyone heading out to Baltimore for APA interviews the best of luck. Looks like a difficult year to be on the market.
Let me just wish everyone heading out to Baltimore for APA interviews the best of luck. Looks like a difficult year to be on the market.
Labels: Metablogging
Monday, December 17, 2007
Reminder CFP: The University of Texas at Austin Philosophy Grad Conference 2008
The deadline for submissions is creeping up for the:
2008 University of Texas at Austin Graduate Philosophy Conference
Keynote Speakers:
David Chalmers (ANU)
Tamar Szabo Gendler (Yale)
Faculty Roundtable: Understanding and Illusion with:
Adam Pautz (UT Austin)
Mark Sainsbury (UT Austin and KCL)
Michael Tye (UT Austin)
When: April 5-6 2008
Where: the live music capital of the world
Call for Papers: Papers are due by January 15th 2008. The official CFP is here.
2008 University of Texas at Austin Graduate Philosophy Conference
Keynote Speakers:
David Chalmers (ANU)
Tamar Szabo Gendler (Yale)
Faculty Roundtable: Understanding and Illusion with:
Adam Pautz (UT Austin)
Mark Sainsbury (UT Austin and KCL)
Michael Tye (UT Austin)
When: April 5-6 2008
Where: the live music capital of the world
Call for Papers: Papers are due by January 15th 2008. The official CFP is here.
Labels: Conferences
Sunday, December 09, 2007
Semantics and Philosophy in Europe
There are definitely some big advantages to living in Texas. It's mid-December, and it's in the 70s outside. Plus, as many Brits over here have observed before me, Thanksgiving really is a great holiday. Until we get some equivalent on the other side of the Pond, this seems like the right place to be.
That said, every so often I do see things going on which make me wish I was able to spend more time in Europe. And my attention has been drawn to the new annual colloquium Semantics and Philosophy in Europe. The first event is being held in Paris (a city I have yet to see, and am starting to think I'll never get to see) on May 2-4 2008.
There's a CFP up for the first meeting, which will feature, amongst others, Herman Cappelen, Robert May, Stephen Neale and Zoltan Szabo as invited speakers. Obviously this is a wonderful opportunity, so get your submissions in by February 15th!
That said, every so often I do see things going on which make me wish I was able to spend more time in Europe. And my attention has been drawn to the new annual colloquium Semantics and Philosophy in Europe. The first event is being held in Paris (a city I have yet to see, and am starting to think I'll never get to see) on May 2-4 2008.
There's a CFP up for the first meeting, which will feature, amongst others, Herman Cappelen, Robert May, Stephen Neale and Zoltan Szabo as invited speakers. Obviously this is a wonderful opportunity, so get your submissions in by February 15th!
Labels: Conferences, Linguistics, Philosophy of Language
X-Phi in the News
Anthony Appiah has what struck me as an interesting and sensible article on experimental and armchair philosophy in the NYT today. Well worth a look.
Labels: Links, Methodology
Saturday, December 08, 2007
Whereof one cannot sing......
Wednesday, December 05, 2007
Ramsey + Moore = 5
